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See United States v. O'Brien, 560 U.S. 218, 221 (2010)("The Court must interpret, once again, §924(c) of Title 18 of the United States Code"). Other decisions include Alleyne v. United States, 133 S.Ct. 2151 (2013); United States v. Abbott, 131 S.Ct. 18 (2010); Dean v. United States, 556 U.S. 568 (2009); Watson v. United States, 552 U.S. 74 (2007); Harris v. United States, 536 U.S. 545 (2002); Castillo v. United States, 530 U.S. 120 (2000); Mascarello v. United States, 524 U.S. 125 (1998); United States v. Gonzales, 520 U.S. 1 (1997); Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S. 137 (1995); Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223 (1993); Deal v. United States, 508 U.S. 129 (1993).
United States v. Serafin, 562 F.3d 1105, 1107-1116 (10th Cir. 2009)("[T]he danger from an unregistered short-barreled rifle is inherent to its use, not merely in its possession. Although Serafin clearly disregarded the law by possessing an illegal short-barreled rifle, we must confine the scope of §924(c)(3)(B) to active, violent crimes which pose a substantial risk that force may be used during the course of the offense"), citing among others United States v. Hull, 456 F.3d 133, 140 (3d Cir. 2006) (possession of an unregistered pipe bomb [included within the definition of firearm in 18 U.S.C. 921(a)(3), (4)] was not a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. 16); Henry v. Bureau of Immigration & Customs Enforcement, 493 F.3d 303, 309 (3d Cir. 2007)(possession of an unregistered pipe bomb with the intent to use was a crime of violence under §16); United States v. Jennings, 195 F.3d 795, 798 (5th Cir. 1999)(possession of a pipe bomb [without reference to intent] was a crime of violence under §16).
United States v. Pineda, 770 F.3d 313, 317 (4th Cir. 2014); United States v. Johnson, 745 F.3d 866, 870 (8th Cir. 2014); United States v. Renteria, 720 F.3d 1245, 1255 (10th Cir. 2013); United States v. Eller, 670 F.3d 762, 765 (7th Cir. 2012); United States v. Pena, 586 F.3d 105, 113 (1st Cir. 2009); United States v. London, 568 F.3d 553, 559 (5th Cir. 2009); United States v. Lopez-Garcia, 565 F.3d 1306, 1322 (11th Cir. 2009).
United States v. Renteria, 720 F.3d at 1255; see also, United States v. Brown, 715 F.3d 985, 993-94 (6th Cir. 2013); United States v. Gill, 685 F.3d 606, 611 (6th Cir. 2012); United States v. Johnson, 677 F.3d 138, 143 (3d Cir. 2012); United States v. Eller, 670 F.3d at 766; United States v. London, 568 F.3d at 559; United States v. Lopez-Garcia, 565 F.3d at 1322; United States v. Perry, 560 F.3d 246, 254 (4th Cir. 2009); see also United States v. Chavez, 549 F.3d 119, 130 (2d Cir. 2008)(noting after quoting the factors that, "while no conviction would lie for a drug dealer's innocent possession of a firearm, ... a drug dealer may be punished under §924(c)(1)(A) where the charged weapon is readily accessible to protect drugs, drug proceeds, or the drug dealer himself"); but see United States v. Hector, 474 F.3d 1150, 1157 (9th Cir. 2007)(internal citations omitted)("Although the Fifth Circuit has developed a non-exclusive list of factors ... we have concluded that this approach is not particularly helpful in close cases.... In our most recent case addressing the 'in furtherance question,' we reiterated the importance of the factual inquiry. We declined once again to adopt a checklist approach to deciding this issue and held that it is the totality of the circumstances, coupled with a healthy dose of a jury's common sense when evaluating the facts in evidence, which will determine whether the evidence suffices to support a conviction").
United States v. Gurka, 605 F.3d 40, 44 (1st Cir. 2010)("We join the three circuits holding Watson does not affect the prong of 18 U.S.C. §924(c)(1)(A) concerned with 'possession in furtherance'), citing in accord, United States v. Gardner, 602 F.3d 97, 103 (2d Cir. 2010); United States v. Mahan, 586 F.3d 1185, 1189 (9th Cir. 2009); see also, United States v. Miranda, 666 F.3d 1280, 1282-284 (11th Cir. 2012); United States v. Dickerson, 705 F.3d 683, 688-90 (7th Cir. 2013).
Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S. 137, 143 (1995); United States v. Isnadin, 742 F.3d 1278, 1307 (11th Cir. 2014); United States v. Haynes, 582 F.3d 686, 704 (7th Cir. 2009); United States v. Combs, 369 F.3d 925, 932 (6th Cir. 2004).
Muscarello v. United States, 524 U.S. 125, 126 (1998)("The question before us is whether the phrase 'carries a firearm' is limited to the carrying of firearms on the person. We hold that it is not so limited. Rather, it also applies to a person who knowingly possesses and carries a firearm in a vehicle, including locked in a glove compartment or trunk of a car, which the person accompanies"); United States v. Franklin, 561 F.3d 398, 403 (5th Cir. 2009); United States v. Winder, 557 F.3d 1129, 1138-139 (10th Cir. 2009); United States v. Robinson, 390 F.3d 853, 878 (6th Cir. 2005); United States v. Williams, 344 F.3d 365, 370 (3d Cir. 2003).
18 U.S.C. 924(c)(4)("For purposes of this subsection, the term 'brandish' means, with respect to a firearm, to display all or part of the firearm, or otherwise make the presence of the firearm known to another person, in order to intimidate that person, regardless of whether the firearm is directly visible to that person"); United States v. Carter, 560 F.3d 1107, 1114 (9th Cir. 2009); United States v. Payne, 763 F.3d 1301, 1304-1305 (11th Cir. 2014).
United States v. Rivera-Rivera, 555 F.3d 277, 291 (1st Cir. 2009); United States v. Mejia, 545 F.3d 179, 207-208 (2d Cir. 2008). This is true even after Alleyne, because the Court continues to recognize a recidivist exception to the Apprendi rule, see, e.g., Alleyne v. United States, 133 S.Ct. 2151, 2160 n.1 ("In Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224 (1998), we recognized a narrow exception to this general rule for the fact of a prior conviction. Because the parties do not contest that decision's vitality, we do not revisit it for purposes of our decision today").
United States v. Lara-Ruiz, 781 F.3d 919, 924 (8th Cir. 2015); United States v. Diaz-Bermudez, 778 F.3d 309, 313-14 (1st Cir. 2015); United States v. Shabazz, 564 F.3d 280, 289 (3d Cir. 2009), citing in accord United States v. Johnson, 507 F.3d 793, 798 (2d Cir. 2007); United States v. Dare, 425 F.3d 634, 642 (9th Cir. 2005); United States v. Avery, 295 F.3d 1158, 1170 (10th Cir. 2002); United States v. Cristobal, 293 F.3d 134, 147 (4th Cir. 2002); United States v. Sandoval, 241 F.3d 549, 551 (7th Cir. 2001); United States v. Pounds, 230 F.3d 1317, 1319 (11th Cir. 2000); United States v. Silas, 227 F.3d 244, 246 (5th Cir. 2000).
United States v. Sandstrom, 594 F.3d 634, 658 (8th Cir. 2010)("... [M]ultiple underlying offenses support multiple §924(c) convictions"); United States v. Catalan-Roman, 585 F.3d 453, 472 (1st Cir. 2009); United States v. Penny, 576 F.3d 297, 316 (6th Cir. 2009)("[W]hen two separate predicate offenses for triggering §924(c)(1) are charged and proved, a defendant may be convicted and sentenced for two separate crimes, even if both offenses were committed in the course of the same event"); United States v. Looney, 532 F.3d 392, 396 (5th Cir. 2008).
United States v. Napolitan, 762 F.3d 297, 311 (3d Cir. 2014), quoting, District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. at 635 ("Needless to say, while the Second Amendment secures 'the right of law-abiding, responsible citizens to use arms in defense of hearth and home,' it does not entitle a drug trafficker to carry a firearm in furtherance of his criminal exploits"); United States v. Bryant, 711 F.3d 364, 368-70 (2d Cir. 2013), citing in accord, United States v. Potter, 630 F.3d 1260, 1261 (9th Cir. 2011) and United States v. Jackson, 555 F.3d 635, 636 (7th Cir. 2009).
United States v. Dixon, 509 U.S. 688, 696 (1993); United States v. Cejas, 761 F.3d 717, 730 (7th Cir. 2014); United States v. Mahdi, 598 F.3d 883, 887 (D.C.Cir. 2010); United States v. Hall, 551 F.3d 257, 266 (4th Cir. 2009).
Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932); United States v. Rentz, 777 F.3d 1105, 1119 (10th Cir. 2015); United States v. Angilau, 717 F.3d 781, 787 (10th Cir. 2013); United States v. Mahdi, 598 F.3d at 888; United States v. Sandstrom, 594 F.3d 634, 654 (8th Cir. 2010); United States v. Beltran-Moreno, 556 F.3d 913, 916 (9th Cir. 2009).
United States v. Cejas, 761 F.3d 717, 730-31; United States v. Ford, 761 F.3d 641, 656-57 (6th Cir. 2014); United States v. Angilau, 717 F.3d at 781, 788-89; United States v. Kennedy, 682 F.3d 244, 257 (3d Cir. 2012); United States v. Sandstrom, 594 F.3d at 658; United States v. Catalan-Roman, 585 F.3d 453, 472 (1st Cir. 2009); United States v. Looney, 532 F.3d 392, 396 (5th Cir. 2008).
Code 1950, § 54-524.101:1; 1972, c. 798; 1973, c. 479; 1974, c. 586; 1975, cc. 14, 15; 1976, c. 614; 1977, c. 409; 1978, cc. 177, 779; 1979, c. 435; 1982, cc. 276, 462; 1985, c. 569; 1986, c. 453; 1988, c. 355; 1990, c. 82; 1991, c. 13; 1992, cc. 685, 737, 756; 1995, c. 538; 1999, c. 722; 2000, cc. 1020, 1041; 2004, c. 461; 2005, cc. 174, 759, 796, 923, 941; 2006, cc. 697, 759; 2008, cc. 79, 618; 2009, c. 750; 2012, cc. 219, 710, 844; 2013, c. 426; 2014, c. 513.
Type: Conference presentationPresenter: Prof. Trevor MarshallConference: Workshop on Chlamydial infectionLocation: Prague, Czech RepublicDate: April 18, 2009See also: Transcript with slides 2b1af7f3a8